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RESPONSE TO APPELLANTS' "FACTS"
While most if not all of the "facts" presented by Appellants are either not
established "facts" at all or are not relevant to the certified questions, Metal Ware feels that a
response to some of them is necessary so that the record is accurate and the attempt to inflame
this matter and portray Metal Ware as a "bad actor" is properly refuted. For example, Farmers
Fact No. 17 states that Metal Ware received notice of a "defective" dehydrator in Oklahoma in
1997. However, there is no evidence at all that the unit involved in that minor fire incident was
defective at all, much less that the defect was the same as the defect involved in the recall.
Furthermore, Facts Nos. 24 and 25 are incorrect statements. The U.S. District Court did not hold
that Metal Ware had a duty to warn the Tabors, and it did not "reject" Metal Ware's argument
that it had no knowledge of the Tabors. To the contrary, the Record clearly reflects that the
District Court determined that " . . . Metal Ware had really no duty to warn them [the
Tabors]. They didn't know about them." (See Transcript of Oral Argument at 15:10-12,
Aplee. Supp. App. at 15.). In that same vein, the Tabors' Fact No. 27 incorrectly states
that it is "uncontradicted that Metal Waie had in its possession information that the
Tabors filled out a product registration card . . .." That statement is not accurate, and the
Record in this case makes it clear that Metal Ware had no information at all indicating the
Tabors had purchased any American Harvest product. Additionally, the Tabors Fact No.
33 is correct but very misleading. It was expected that ShopKo had such units on its shelf
after the recall because FD-50 models were still manufactured after the recall and after
the changes to the product to address the defect, and they are still for sale today.

1

ARGUMENT
I.

Utah Should Continue to Follow its Current Precedent, and Appellants offer
no Reasons for Doing Otherwise
A.

Appellants Miss the Mark Completely in Their Briefing
Both Appellants completely miss the mark by failing to address the

questions which have been certified to this Court. Appellants fail to offer any persuasive
reasons for adopting either of the minority, non-traditional theories of successor
liability-/. £., continuity of enterprise or product line. In fact, they fail to offer any reasons
at all, electing instead to simply attempt to re-argue the facts of this case (as they perceive
them) under the rubric of the two theories as though they already were the law in Utah.
(See, e.g., Br. of Farmers at 21-24; Br. of Tabors at 29-32). This case is not here as a
second appeal, but rather on certain certified questions. Appellants leap past the entire
point of the certification, and attempt to argue for liability as though the theories were
already the law in Utah. They present unsupported facts and use inflammatory language
in an effort to lure this Court into a knee jerk reaction based upon the Appellant's spin on
this case instead of focusing on why either theory should be applied as the law in Utah in
all cases.
It is undisputed that in Utah "[t]he general rule is that a successor
corporation is not responsible for the torts of a predecessor entity," subject to four narrow

2

exceptions.1 See Certification at p. 4; Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 1999 UT
App 230, K 15, 986 P.2d 748, 752; see also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability § 12 (2003). The certified question before this Court is whether Utah should
abandon the traditional rule and instead adopt either the product line or continuity of
enterprise theory. Instead of offering argument and authority concerning the adoption of
either theory, Appellants instead simply assume the theories already apply, and then
attempt to argue why they should prevail in this case. The misguided effort to simply
apply the "facts" of this case to a minority rule that has not even been adopted in Utah is
of no assistance to this Court in view of the certified questions presented.
Both Appellants also improperly argue for liability under the traditional
exceptions of Macris. For example, Farmers' opening argument is that the traditional
exceptions to successor non-liability apply (Br. of Farmers at 17.), and the "Tabors
maintain that at least one factor exists of the four [traditional] factors[.]" (Br. of Tabors
at 20). These arguments are completely unavailing for at least two reasons. First, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not ask this Court to decide whether one or more of
the traditional exceptions to successor non-liability apply in this case. Rather, the Tenth

1

The traditional exceptions impose liability on an asset purchaser successor when:
"(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume [the selling corporation's
liabilities]; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of seller and
purchaser [i.e., a de facto merger]; (3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation
of the selling corporation; or (4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to
escape liability for such debts." Macris, 1999 UT App 230 at ^f 15, 986 P.2d 748 (quoting
Fiorom, 867 F.2d at 575 n. 2.)
3

Circuit asked this Court to determine whether Utah would abandon the traditional rule
already in place (along with its exceptions) and adopt either the product line or continuity
of enterprise theory. Second, none of the traditional exceptions-which are already the
law in Utah-were ever raised or argued by any party in the U.S. District Court. The U.S.
District Court correctly stated that "[n]o party has argued that any of the four recognized
exceptions to the general rule of successor corporation non-liability applies in the present
case." (Aplt. Farmers' Appendix to Tenth Circuit at 64-65, Order, Docket Entry #98 at
pp. 12-13). The Tenth Circuit also acknowledged in the certification order that "none of
[the traditional four exceptions] had been argued or applied in the case." (Certification
Order at 3). Thus, the Maoris exceptions are not properly before this Court, and are not
material to this certification in any event.
B.

The Majority Rule Should Continue to Be Utah Law
Vast authority from other jurisdictions and from our own Utah Court of

Appeals supports continued adherence to the traditional rule of Maoris, which is the
majority U.S. rule. See Decius v. Action Collection. Service Inc., 2004 UT App 484, ]f 8,
105 P.3d 956. See also e.g, Leannis v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977)
("The general rule in the majority of American jurisdictions . . . is that a corporation
which purchases the assets of another corporation does not succeed to the liabilities of the
selling corporation."). Since the product line theory was first adopted in California, only
a very few (five) jurisdictions have ever followed, and since the continuity of enterprise
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theory was adopted in Michigan, only a very few (three) jurisdictions have adopted that
theory. All other jurisdictions (thirty-two) have rejected the non-traditional product line
and continuity of enterprise exceptions and adhered to the traditional rule of Section 12 of
the Restatement (as reflected in Utah in Macris).2
The Utah Court of Appeals recently confirmed that the traditional rule is
still the rule in Utah in Decius v. Action Collection. Service Inc., 2004 UT App 484, ^ 8,
105 P.3d 956. In Decius, the Utah Court of Appeals cited Fish v. Ams ted Industries, Inc.,
376 N.W.2d 820, 828 (Wis. 1985), for the proposition that the legislature is better suited
to change the law of successor liability. See Decius, 2004 UT App 484 at 1HJ8-15, 105
P.3d 956. In the end, the Utah Court of Appeals expressly "decline[d] to expand
successor liability." Id. at f 18. Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the continuity
of enterprise theory, noted that any changes to successor liability away from the
traditional rule are best left to the legislature, and found no reason to move beyond the
traditional rule.
Not only is the traditional rule the majority rule, but it is also the better
reasoned rule according to the Restatement and the majority of courts. According to the
Restatement, the traditional rule is supported by fairness and efficiency considerations.
Imposing liability on asset purchase successors "would, for no compelling reason, impede

2

Opinions from the various jurisdictions are outlined in Metal Ware's opening
brief. (See Br. of Metal Ware at 21-22.)
5

the free alienability of corporate assets, thereby discouraging shareholder investment of
capital and increasing social costs;" and extending successor liability beyond the four
traditional exceptions "would, in the judgment of most courts, be unfair and socially
wasteful." Id. The non-traditional exceptions espoused by Plaintiffs are also
"inconsistent with the principle of products liability law that imposes responsibility on the
party who created the risk and was in a position to prevent its occurrence" because they
impose liability on an entity that was never in the chain of distribution and never placed
the product into the stream of commerce." Id.
The traditional rule is also founded on the longstanding rule of products
liability law that those who are liable for a product defect are those who manufacture,
sell, or distribute a product - i.e., those in the chain of distribution. See Restatement
(Third) of the Law of Torts: Product Liability § 12 cmt. a (1998). The product line and
continuity of enterprise theories extend liability to non-sellers who are not in the chain of
distribution, and this is "not consistent with at least one major premise of strict liability,
which is to place responsibility for a defective product on the manufacturer who placed
that product into commerce." Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla.
1982). On this point, the Appellants make the misleading and erroneous statement that if
they cannot recover from Metal Ware, they are left without a remedy. {See Br. of Tabors
at 26, 31, 34; Br. of Farmers at 18.) This is simply not true. Plaintiffs settled with and
recovered significant sums from both the retailer (ShopKo) and the wholesaler
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(Englewood)-the two entities in the chain of distribution. (See Br. of Farmers at p. I,
noting that Shopko and Englewood "settled out"). The Tabors also continue to seek
recovery from the manufacturer of the product, American Harvest, Inc., of Minnesota.
(See Br. of Tabors to Tenth Circuit at 34, seeking default judgment against the
manufacturer; Br. of Metal Ware to Tenth Circuit at 53-54, discussing implications of
recourse against the manufacturer). Because the Tabors and Farmers already recovered
several hundred thousand dollars from ShopKo and Englewood, entities in the chain of
distribution, it is improper and untrue for them to claim they are "left without a remedy"
if Metal Ware is not a viable target for them.
The Tabors repeatedly suggest that the asset purchase between Metal Ware
and American Harvest, Inc., somehow constituted a "hawkish" business practice. (Br. of
Tabors at 22, 32, 33, 43.) The Tabors criticize Metal Ware and American Harvest for
structuring the asset purchase to avoid product liability exposure to Metal Ware as an
asset purchaser. (See Br. of Tabors at 24.) Such language and argument that Metal Ware
somehow defrauded the Tabors by structuring the deal with American Harvest as an asset
purchase is unfounded, inflammatory, and improper. The law has long recognized the
general rule of non-liability of an asset purchaser. See, e.g., Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v.
Neways, Inc., 1999 UT App 230, ^ 15, 986 P.2d 748; Polius v. Clark Equipment Co., 802
F.2d 75, 77-78 (3d. Cir. 1986) ("Under the well-settled rule of corporate law, where one
company sells or transfers all of its assets to another, the second entity does not become
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liable for the debts and liabilities, including torts, of the transferor.") (citation to
secondary authority omitted).3 For the Tabors to claim that an entity that acquires assets
through an asset purchase agreement is somehow engaged in a "hawkish" business deal is
nothing more than hyperbole. Additionally, the Appellants ignore the fact that this case
involves a USCPSC recall proceeding that was initiated, undertaken, and then closed by
the USCPSC in 1995-two years before Metal Ware became involved at all. Appellant's
correctly acknowledge that the USCPSC "imposed a continuing obligation on American
Harvest," (Farmer's Br. At p. 3), but they then attempt to impose some sort of duty on
Metal Ware, ignoring the admitted fact that the recall obligation ran only to American
Harvest, and never to Metal Ware.
The Tabors' brief actually supports Metal Ware's position that the issue of
successor liability is best addressed by the Legislature. The Tabors point out that the
Utah Legislature has, in fact, delved into products liability law. (Br. of Tabors at 38-39,
referring to the Utah Products Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-15-1 to -7 (2006), in
opining on the views of the Legislature with respect to products liability). As Metal Ware

3

While the longstanding rule permits asset purchases of "all of the assets of one
entity to another," it is worth noting that the asset purchase between Metal Ware and
American Harvest, Inc., was not an agreement by Metal Ware to purchase all of
American Harvest, Inc.'s assets. Rather, the asset purchase agreement was to purchase
only certain American Harvest product lines, (see Br. of Metal Ware at 9, ^[3; Tabor's
Appendix to Tenth Circuit at 424-425, setting forth asset purchase agreement that lists
specific assets acquired), and the Tabor's suggestion otherwise is inaccurate. (See Br. of
Tabors at 36.)
8

discussed in its opening brief, the Restatement and leading cases on the asset purchase
successor liability issues before this court assert that legislatures are in a better position
than the courts to address these issues. See Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts,
Product Liability § 12, Reporters' Note, cmt. b. Rationale (1998) at p.9 of Exhibit B to
Metal Ware's Opening Brief, quoting Fish v. AmstedIndus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 829
(Wis. 1985) ("[T]he legislature is in a better position to make broad public policy
decisions in actions based on products liability law."); Leannis v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565
F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[C]ourts are ill-equipped . . . to balance equities among
future plaintiffs and defendants . . . such broad public policy issues are best handled by
legislatures with their comprehensive machinery for public input and debate."), and citing
other cases; see also Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, LLC, 63 P.3d 1040, 1047-1050 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003) (outlining and adopting the very approach espoused by Metal Ware).
The Utah Court of Appeals has also stated that modification of corporate
and products liability law to expand successor liability is better left to the Legislature.
Both The Tabors and Farmers cite to a paragraph in Decius that sets forth the "three
reasons [posited] by courts for expanding successor liability." Decius, 2004 UT App 484
at 1J14, 105 P.3d 956 (quoted in Br. of Farmers at 20; and Br. of Tabors at 27.) However,
what both Farmers and the Tabors fail to mention is that in the very next paragraph, the
Decius court criticizes and rejects the three reasons. Id. at f 15. The Decius court states
that "[w]hile the notion of spreading costs exclusively on the basis of relative wealth
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holds a certain Marxist charm, 'the legislature is in a better position to make [such a]
broad public policy decision[]." Id. at \\5.

The Court of Appeals then goes on to make

clear that it udecline[s] to expand successor liability." Id. at ^[18.
As Metal Ware explained in detail its opening brief, there are several
general policy arguments set forth in cases from other jurisdictions that support Metal
Ware's position that the non-traditional theories that seek to impose liability on an asset
purchaser must be rejected.4 The nature of these arguments, however, support the
position that if long-standing rules of corporate succession and successor non-liability are
going to be altered, such a change in the law is better left to the Legislature.

4

The stated policy reasons include: the asset purchase successor did not realize
the profit for the product; the asset purchase successor did not create the risk presented by
the product because it did not manufacture the product; the asset purchase successor
cannot improve or correct the defective product that was already sold into the market by
the manufacturer (especially where it has already been recalled by the manufacturer prior
to the asset purchase); the asset purchase successor did not represent that the product was
non-defective and safe by selling the product; and because the asset purchase successor
negotiated and paid for the goodwill or reputation of the predecessor's product line in the
asset purchase agreement, and to hold the successor liable for defects in products
manufactured by the predecessor would be forcing the successor to pay twice for the
goodwill of the predecessor. See, e.g., Pearson, 90 S.W.3d 46, 51-52 (Ky. 2002); Jones
v. Johnson Machine & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982) (discussing five
reasons for rejecting the product line and continuity of enterprise theories); Fish, 376
N.W.2d at 827-28; Johnston, 830 P.2d at 1144; Guzman, 567 N.E.2d at 931; Travis, 565
F.2d 443, 444-45 (7th Cir.); Griggs v. Capitol Machine Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 294
n.5 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (listing seven of the "public policies" that would be impacted by
adopting a non-traditional theory which "impl[y] in the strongest possible terms that the
proper province for dealing with any underlying policies is in the legislative department
of government and not the judicial").
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Metal Ware reiterates that the same reasons for rejecting the product line
theory also constitute valid reasons for rejecting the continuity of enterprise theory. See
e.g, Fish v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Wis. 1985) ("We decline to
adopt the 'expanded continuation' exception to nonliability for the same reasons that we
declined to adopt the product line exception."); Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts,
Product Liability § 12 cmt. a, cmt. b, and Reporters' Note, cmt. b. Rationale (1998). In
addressing the product line theory, Farmers relies heavily on the New Mexico case of
Garcia v. Coe, 933 P.2d 243, 247 (N.M. 1997). Garcia has been criticized and expressly
not followed by jurisdictions cited by Metal Ware. The cases of Winsor v. Glasswerks
PHX, LLC, 634 P.3d 1040 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003), and Pearson v. Nat'I Feeding Sys., Inc.,
90 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. 2002), both specifically mentioned Garcia in refusing to follow the
minority position espoused by Garcia. Moreover, in rejecting Garcia, Pearson cites to
eleven additional cases that have rejected the position espoused by Garcia.5

5

Bernard v. Kee Manufacturing Co., 409 So.2d 1047 (Fla.1982); Gonzalez v. Rock
Wool Engineering & Equip. Co. Inc., 453 N.E.2d 792 (111. Ct. App. 1983); Pelc v. Bendix
Machine Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Young v. Fulton Iron
Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo.Ct.App.1986); Jones v. Johnson Machine & Press Co.,
320 N.W.2d 481 (1982); The Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Products, Inc., 347 N.W.2d
118 (N..D. 1984); Flaugherv. Cone Automatic Machine Co., 507N.E.2d331 (Ohio 1987);
Hamaker v. Kenwel- Jackson Machine, Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D.1986); Griggs v.
Capitol Machine Works, 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.App.1985); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool
Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984); Fish v. AmstedIndustries Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis.
1985).
11

Finally, the Tabors and Farmers both mistakenly contend that Metal Ware
should owe them a duty based upon authority imposing duties on the manufacturer of a
product. For example, the Tabors insist that this court should "ensure that innocent
purchasers of defective products will have recourse against the manufacturer of the
defective product[.]" (Br. of Tabors at 37.) They claim that the Tabors should have
recourse against the entity that placed the product into the stream of commerce. (Br. of
Tabors at 39.) They incorrectly assert that Metal Ware is the manufacturer of the product.
(Br. of Tabors at 28-29.) To be clear, Metal Ware is not the manufacturer of the product.
Metal Ware purchased certain assets from the manufacturer that placed the product into
the stream of commerce. If Metal Ware were the manufacturer, the parties would not
have been involved in briefing successor liability theories to the U.S. District Court,
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and this Court for the last several years. Argument from
the Tabors suggesting that Metal Ware should be liable based upon cases concerning the
liability of manufacturers and sellers who placed the product into the stream of
commerce is misguided and any legal authority regarding manufacturer duties is simply
inapposite.
II.

This Court Should Not Create and Impose an Independent Duty to Warn on a
Successor to an Asset Purchase Because the Matter Is Better Left to the
Legislature, and Utah Law Already Requires a Special Relationship Before
Imposing a Duty
Just as they did with the minority theories discussed above, Appellants

again simply attempt to apply the "facts" of this case to the independent duty to warn
12

theory as though it already applied, without analyzing why the theory should be adopted.
Utah should not create and impose a new, independent duty to warn on a successor to an
asset purchase. Appellants erroneously assert that Utah law imposes an independent duty
to warn on asset purchase successors. {See Br. of Tabors at 24.). It is because Utah has
not adopted the independent duty to warn theory that the matter was certified to this Court
by the Tenth Circuit. Utah has never adopted an independent failure to warn theory in
products liability law, and a decision to expand or modify products liability law is better
left to the legislature given the broad policy implication and the possible ramifications
that such a change may have on other areas of the law. Moreover, Utah law already
requires a special relationship for an independent duty to be imposed, and there is no need
to create new law and create a special duty for the asset purchase successor context.
Even if this Court were to create and impose an independent duty to warn
on a successor entity in the products liability context, such a duty should only arise in very
narrow circumstances-none of which would create the duty in this case. Other
jurisdictions impose the duty in narrow circumstances where a three part standard is met there is an independent, special relationship between the successor and current owner of
the product made by the predecessor. In evaluating this three-part standard, five factors
are considered in other jurisdictions.6

6

The five factors used in other jurisdictions include: (1) the asset purchase
successor entity's succession to service contracts; (2) coverage of the particular product
possessed by the customer by a service contract; (3) actual service of the product by the
13

Appellants erroneously contend that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A
constitutes authority for the independent duty to warn. (See Br. of Farmers at 25-27.)
Plaintiffs confuse and incorrectly intermingle two wholly different and distinct legal
duties: (1) the duty to warn owed by an entity within the chain of distribution, imposed on
"one who sells" pursuant to Section 402 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and (2)
the independent duty to warn theory owed by an asset purchase successor who is not in
the chain of distribution as "one who sells." These different theories are not the same,
and it is unavailing to intermingle legal authority discussing these separate theories.7
Section 402A imposes strict liability upon "[those] who sell[]" within the chain of
distribution,8 while the independent failure to warn theory, on the other hand, imposes

asset purchase successor; (4) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the defect; and
(5) the asset purchase successor's knowledge of the customer's location.
7

For example, Farmers cites to Freeman v. United Cities Propane Gas of Georgia,
807 F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Ga. 1992), Khan v. Velsicol Chemical Corp,, 711 S.W.2d 310
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986), Hiner v. Deere and Co., Inc., 340 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2003). (See
Br. of Farmers at 30-32.) None of the cases cited by Farmers deals with successor
liability, though. Instead, they discuss legal issues such as the learned intermediary
doctrine, the liability of manufacturers and other suppliers in the chain of distribution, and
the duties of the manufacturer after selling a recalled product.
8

The Restatement reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(Emphasis added.)
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a duty to warn on an asset purchase successor where there is an independent, special
relationship between the asset purchase successor and the customer or owner of the
product - the person with possession of the product. See, e.g., Polius v. Clark Equip. Co.,
802 F.2d 75, 84 (3d Cir. 1986). Metal Ware is not "one who sells" within the chain of
distribution, and therefore Restatement 402A and duties imposed by it and the cases
interpreting Section 402 A do not apply. As the Texas Court of Appeals explained in
Griggs v. Capitol Machine Works, Inc., reliance upon Restatement authority imposing
liability against manufacturers and those in the chain of distribution is "misplaced" when
dealing with the successor liability issues and liability of entities not within the chain of
distribution such as those before this Court. 690 S.W.2d 287, 293. The generic term
"duty to warn" should not be so freely used so as to confuse and incorrectly intermingle
these two separate and distinct legal theories. See, e.g., Griggs v. Capitol Machine
Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287, 291-93 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that Section 402A
only applies to those within the chain of distribution who sold the product in rejecting the
product line theory and the plaintiffs argument that 402 A imposed a duty to warn on an
asset purchase successor entity).
As Metal Ware explained in detail in its opening brief, there is no need for
this Court to create the tort of an independent duty to warn for at least two reasons. First,
"the legislature is in a better position to make broad public policy decisions in actions
based on products liability law." Fish v. AmstedIndus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Wis.
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1985); Leannis v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1977); Restatement (Third)
of the Law of Torts §12, Reporters' Note, cmt. b. Rationale. Second, judicially creating a
new duty is unnecessary given existing Utah law that a special relationship is necessary to
impose a duty. See Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) ('The
law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty to act only when certain special
relationships exist between the parties."); Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80, f 910, 125 P.3d 906. ("[A]n omission or failure to act can generally give rise to [a duty]
only in the presence of some external circumstance-a special relationship). This current
"special relationship" standard is the standard imposed by the leading cases on the
independent duty to warn theory. In the end, in order to impose an independent duty to
warn, there must be an independent, special relationship between the asset purchase
successor and the customer or owner of the product - the person with possession of the
product See, e.g., Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 84 (3d Cir. 1986); Gee, 615
F.2d at 866; see also Harris v. T.I, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 610 (Va. 1992); see generally 63
Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 138 (1997). There is no need to create new law in this
case where no relationship of any kind existed between Metal Ware and the Tabors.
If this Court does create and impose an independent duty to warn on postsale asset purchases, it should consider the three elements of the standard as articulated by
other jurisdictions: (1) the relevant relationship - between the actual owner or possessor
of the product and the asset purchase successor; (2) whether this relationship is a special
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one as determined by whether there is substantial and meaningful contact; (3) whether the
relationship has developed as an independent one, based upon a business relationship that
has developed exclusive of the asset purchase succession.
One critical aspect of the independent duty to warn issue is clarification of
the relevant relationship. The two competing relationships are (1) the relationship
between the asset purchase successor and the business customers of the predecessor
including continuing wholesalers and distributors; and (2) the relationship between the
asset purchase successor and the possessors or owners of the product who constitute end
users or consumers of the product. The Plaintiffs acknowledge the distinction between a
duty to warn a customer and a duty to warn an ultimate consumer. (See Br. of Farmers at
28; Br. of Tabors at 44, offering no independent analysis but adopting Farmers' argument
on the independent duty to warn issue).
The relevant relationship is between the successor entity and the owner who
possesses the product, not between the successor entity and a business customer such as a
retailer or wholesaler that sold the product to the possessor. This relationship must be a
direct and continuing relationship with the possessor of the product. The primary reason
for this was stated most succinctly by the Kansas Supreme Court in Stratton v. Garvey
Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984): "Were it not so, a duty to warn
would arise in any circumstance in which a successor has any dealings with its
predecessor's customers." id. (Emphasis added.); see also Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft
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Service, Inc., 512 F.Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1981). If the relevant relationship is simply a
determination of whether the asset purchase successor maintained a business relationship
with wholesalers and retail customers who also did business with the predecessor
corporation, a duty will nearly always arise, and it will essentially nullify the standard of
requiring an independent, special relationship based upon substantial and meaningful
contact. See Harris, 413 at 610; Polius, 802 F.2d at 84. The independent duty to warn
should be narrowly-tailored, and should not arise in a circumstance where the location of
the product is unknown, and it is unknown who owns or possesses the product; but the
asset purchase successor of the company that manufactured and sold the product merely
continued to business with a wholesaler and retailer that sold the same model of the
defective product.
The three part standard and the five factors all support the conclusion that
the independent duty to warn is owed to the person who possesses or owns the product,
i.e., an end user or consumer. The Court should not impose this narrowly-tailored
independent duty to warn if the Court cannot identify an independent, special relationship
based upon substantial and meaningful contact between the asset purchase successor and the
person or entity that owns or possesses the actual, particular, defective product. To simply
require a continued business relationship between an asset purchase successor and
wholesalers or retailers of the product sold by the manufacturer destroys the "special"
relationship requirement. "[T]he mere continuation of a name and acquisition of good
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will" is insufficient to impose an independent duty to warn, Travis, 565 F.2d at 448; see
also Gee, 615 F.2d at 866, cited in Florom, 867 F.2d at 577 (explaining that succession
alone does not impose a duty to warn.)
The fact that a consumer product is involved as opposed to an industrial
product or piece of industrial machinery is another important consideration in this case.
The first element (identifying the relevant relationship) is critical in a case involving a
consumer product, and Metal Ware cited three cases involving consumer products that
held that no duty was imposed on the asset purchase successor because it had no
relationship with the end user or consumer. See Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 86566 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an asset purchase successor owed no duty to warn
because "[tjhere [were] no facts in the record to indicate that [any successor entity] had
any relationship with users of [the drug]"); Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp. 769,
770 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding no independent duty to warn in case where there was no
indication that [the manufacturer] had a relationship with retail customers); Tracey v
Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 745 F. Supp. 1099, 1111-1113 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
("Emphasizing] that the relationship which gives rise to this duty is between the
successor corporation and the particular allegedly defective product," and holding that no
duty to warn was owed because even though the asset purchase successor performed
maintenance on the model of shotgun involved and provided spare parts for that model,
there was "no evidence that [asset purchase successors] performed service on the
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particular shotgun involved in this case or that defendants were aware of the location of
the shotgun or the location of its owner").
To impose an independent duty to warn based upon succession and
continued wholesale and retail business would swallow the general rule of successor nonliability. The relationship must be a direct and continuing relationship between the asset
purchase successor and the possessor of the product. Otherwise, "a duty to warn would
arise in any circumstance in which a successor has any dealings with its predecessor's
customers." Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984).
The five factors demonstrate that the independent duty to warn theory is
more applicable in the context of industrial machinery and equipment, as opposed to
consumer goods. Metal Ware has referred the court to three consumer goods cases, and
the courts imposed no duty of care because there was no relationship with the end user or
consumer. See Gee, 615 F.2d at 865-66; Wessinger, 685 F. Supp. at 770; Tracey, 745 F.
Supp. at 1111-1113. The five factors also demonstrate that the independent duty to warn
is imposed when the asset purchase successor develops a relationship with the actual
owner or possessor of the actual defective product, as opposed to a relationship with a
wholesaler or retailer that distributes the same model as the model of the defective
product. The factors do not point towards imposing a duty where the asset purchase
successor dealt with the other products of the same make and model as the defective
product, and serviced other products of the same make and model, without any
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knowledge of the location of the particular defective product that caused the damage or
who owned it. See, e.g., Tracey v. Winchester Repeating Arms Company, 745 F. Supp.
1099, 1100-02 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding no duty because there was no evidence that the
asset purchase successor performed service "on the particular shotgun involved in this
case," and no evidence that the successor was "aware of the location of the shotgun or the
location of its owner," despite fact that successor performed maintenance on the model at
issue and was aware of the type of defect in that model); see also Stratton v. Garvey Int'l,
Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1292-93, 95-96 (holding no duty because asset purchase successor
did not perform maintenance on the particular man-lift product in grain elevator in
Wichita that injured plaintiff, even though successor had done work on a purportedly
similar man lift at a different location).
Farmers criticizes Metal Ware for doing "absolutely nothing to warn the
Tabors." (Br. of Farmers at 36.) However, the law is clear that Metal Ware had no duty
to warn the Tabors—individuals who were completely unknown to Metal Ware. Even if
the duty did exist, it is clear in this case that there was no practical meas to convey a
warning to these unknown individuals. Because Metal Ware purchased the assets of the
manufacturer of the defective product by an asset purchase, the general rule of nonliability applied to Metal Ware. Further, there was never any pursuit by Appellants of the
traditional exceptions to non-liability in the U.S. District Court, and therefore no evidence
of any such theories. The four traditional exceptions were not even preserved for appeal
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to the Tenth Circuit, and their applicability is not a certified issue.
Metal Ware owed no duty of care to the Tabors under the product line or
continuity of enterprise theories, two minority theories that this Court should expressly
reject and refuse to follow as the court of appeals directed in Decius. Additionally, no
duty of care was owed by Metal Ware to the Tabors under the independent duty to warn
theory; there is no relationship between Metal Ware and the Tabors, much less an
independent, special relationship between them based upon substantial and meaningful
contact.
Finally, all of the foregoing presumes a recently discovered defect that had
not yet been addressed still existed for Metal Ware to warn against. Appellants ignore the
fact that the 1995 USCPSC recall was a warning about the defect, and that the recall had
been closed before Metal Ware had any involvement at all with American Harvest. The
"defect" at issue in this case was several years old, and had been addressed by the recall
procedures required by the USCPSC. In the end, there was no duty to warn in this case,
and there was no effective way to communicate a warning to the Tabors even if the duty
existed because Metal Ware had no idea they existed at all and because the testimony of
the ShopKo representative, Ms. Schroeder, demonstrated that a warning to ShopKo would
not have reached the Tabors anyway. In the end, how was Metal Ware supposed to know
that ShopKo sold a defective unit subject to the recall more than a year after the recall
required such units to be off of its shelves, much less that a Utah ShopKo sold it to the
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Tabors? Shopko and Englewood saw this problem, and settled with the Appellants for
several hundred thousand dollars.
CONCLUSION
Utah should continue to adhere to the traditional, majority rule. As
minority, non-traditional exceptions, the product line and continuity of enterprise are illconceived and cause far greater problems than they would remedy. Additionally, the
independent duty to warn should not be adopted. If this Court does adopt the independent
duty to warn theory, it should be narrowly tailored as it has been in other jurisdictions.
Irrespective of the outcome of any of the certified questions, Metal Ware was properly
dismissed by the U.S. District Court.
Dated this 3 1 ^ day of October 2006.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

Brian C. Webber
Attorneys for The Metal Ware Corporation
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